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1Abstract
We quantify the impact of network-based learning and inuence on measures of female
power and child nutrition in rural India. Empowering women to have greater say in child rearing
may generate greater and more lasting benets to children than nutrition supplementation.
While researchers have used proxy reports or correlates like caste to trace networks, we map
networks by surveying friends of respondents. We use participation in a womens education
program to identify increases in female power, as well as stronger and more diverse networks.
We study the ways in which networks aect individuals, namely learning and inuence. Finally,
we characterize the benets of using survey data rather than proxies to identify networks. Our
results linking networks to child nutrition should also inform child health policy.
1.1 Motivation
Almost a third of all children in developing countries are malnourished (Smith and Haddad, 1
2000). How can we improve child welfare? One possible solution is to empower women. 2
Evidence suggests mothers invest more than fathers in their children, hence women who 3
can inuence their household's resource allocation have healthier children than those who 4
cannot (Maitra, 2004; Thomas et al., 2002; Quisumbing and Bri ere, 1999). In this paper, we 5
quantify the impact of network-based learning and inuence on measures of female autonomy 6
and child nutrition. 7
A woman's ability to inuence household resource allocation depends on her notion of 8
identity, her bargaining power, and the social norm1, which in turn depend on the local 9
culture (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Identity can be a source of strength and condence 10
(Sen, 2006) but in the presence of constricting social norms, identity can conne and limit 11
power. Since bargaining power is an inherently unobservable concept, economists use proxy 12
variables to quantify it. Education, contraceptive use, and asset-ownership are three key 13
proxies but can be dicult to inuence in remote and poor regions. In such regions, we 14
argue peer networks can be more eective than traditional approaches at changing the social 15
norm, bargaining power, and hence child nutrition. 16
1A social norm refers to the behavioral expectations within society or a sub-group of society. Norms
\coordinate people's expectations in interactions that possess multiple equilibria" (Durlauf and Blume,
2008).
2To study whether peer networks inuence bargaining power and therefore child welfare, 17
we test the following hypotheses: 18
 Does the bargaining power of a woman's peers aect her own bargaining power? 19
 Do social learning and inuence cause networks to change a woman's parenting behav- 20
ior? 21
 Do women with greater bargaining power invest more in their children? 22
 Do women with greater bargaining power invest more equally in boys and girls? 23
Connectedness to peer networks, as measured by network size, strength, and composi- 24
tion, aects individual identity. Individuals learn new information from peers and trust the 25
information because it came from a friend. They also compare themselves to their friends 26
and dene their well-being relative to their friends. Friends provide information and support, 27
and also inuence behavior. Friends thus help dene identity, and can even change how an 28
individual sees herself. Peer networks in traditional societies (as in many developing coun- 29
tries) may be homogenous and stratied by income or social hierarchy. Such homogeneity 30
may limit the ow of information across the network. In combination with restricting social 31
norms, homogenous and weak networks leave little scope for friends to inuence each other's 32
behavior in positive ways. In this paper, we examine whether network-based learning or 33
inuence can increase female autonomy, and thus improve child welfare. We examine this 34
relationship using a causal model and primary data from India. 35
Indian per-capita income has more than doubled since the mid-nineties. Agricultural 36
production is at an all-time high, and large buer stocks of cereals lie in government granaries. 37
Such economic and agricultural success notwithstanding, over forty percent of all Indian 38
children under the age of ve suer from malnutrition. By contrast, only about thirty percent 39
of sub-Saharan African children are similarly malnourished (Gragnolati, et al., 2005). The 40
fruits of India's economic growth do not appear to be reaching many of its youth. In addition, 41
3social norms greatly restrict a woman's say in her household, and she is used to thinking 42
of herself almost as someone's property. As a result, the woman often has little say in the 43
household resource allocation, and Indian children continue to suer from malnutrition. 44
Most theoretical models of parental investment in children assume arbitrarily that the 45
mother inherently prefers greater investment in children, i.e. that she is more altruistic 46
than the father (Agarwal, 2004). In this paper, we develop a utility maximization model 47
in which consumption smoothing gives parents an economic incentive to invest in their 48
children. Social networks inuence the mother's allocation decision in three ways: rst, 49
support groups increase her disagreement utility, and allow her greater control of household 50
resources.2 Second, learning through networks removes constraints placed by social norms, 51
allowing the woman a greater range of choices in her domestic life. Third, identity utility 52
from belonging to networks causes a woman to be inuenced by her friends' choices, and 53
mimic their actions.3 Policy-makers can harness the power of learning and inuence through 54
networks to bring about greater investments in child welfare. 55
We collect primary data on self-reported networks, female empowerment, and child nu- 56
trition in rural north India because existing datasets do not report information on peer 57
networks. The data are from the state of Uttarakhand, which is nestled in the Indian Hi- 58
malayas (the cross-hatched region in the inset of Figure 1). Most villages are remote and 59
lack access to basic infrastructure such as government schools and hospitals. Uttarakhandi 60
women tend not to be well educated and have very low mobility. The remoteness of the 61
region and lack of good roads combined with stringent social norms mean that once married, 62
women are unable to visit friends or even parents regularly. This state of isolation and igno- 63
rance, accompanied by the constricting social norms restrict women to the narrow spheres 64
of family and housework. 65
To model a shock to female bargaining power, we use a government program called 66
2Disagreement or threat-point utility refers to the utility each adult receives if the household bargain fails
and cooperation breaks down (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, 1995, p. 839).
3Identity utility is the \gain when actions conform to actions and ideals, and the loss insofar as they do
not" (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010, p.18).
4Mahila Samakhya (MS). The program aims to increase bargaining power through education 67
in targeted areas. Mahila Samakhya has been in place in Uttarakhand since 1995, covering 68
2416 villages in six of thirteen districts in the state (program districts are represented with a 69
thick border in Figure 1). Our survey area covers six randomly-chosen Uttarakhand districts, 70
four with the program and two without. (The survey districts are represented in Figure 1 with 71
a dotted pattern. The four districts with a thick border and dotted patterns are the program 72
districts. The two dotted districts without a thick border are non-program districts.) 73
This paper is the rst to study how networks aect child welfare through bargaining 74
power. We explicitly measure the eect of peer networks on bargaining power and child 75
welfare. We also collect data on a unique community-level intervention to increase female 76
empowerment through education and use it to identify a shock to female bargaining power 77
and spillover eects through peer networks. Further, economists tend to use caste or sub- 78
caste as proxies for networks in India. The result of a program like Mahila Samakhya is 79
to expand and diversify networks, which would not be captured by caste or sub-caste. Our 80
data allow us to examine the quality of caste and sub-caste as proxies for networks. 81
Studying the links between networks, female power, and child nutrition helps us under- 82
stand how best to target development programs aimed at empowering women or improving 83
child welfare. The importance of network ties suggests development programs should target 84
clusters of villages to exploit the social learning and social inuence eects of networks. Fur- 85
ther, if improving female power has a greater marginal impact on child malnutrition than 86
nutrition supplementation, policies should invest more in programs that aim to increase 87
female power. 88
2 Literature Review 89
This paper diers from existing literature in three ways. The economics literature assumes 90
that women invest more than men in children because they are more altruistic. Rather than 91
5make this arbitrary assumption, we develop a causal model that provides women an economic 92
incentive to invest in their children. Second, economists usually ignore the role of networks in 93
determining bargaining power. We combine elements of the demography diusion literature 94
with identity economics to model bargaining power as a function of peer networks. Third, 95
economists exploit rigidity in social hierarchy to use caste and sub-caste as proxies for peer 96
networks in India. We use primary data on self-reported networks to test whether caste and 97
sub-caste are good proxies for actual networks. 98
Economists tend to assume that men and women have inherently dierent preferences 99
with regard to household resource allocation, so bargaining power aects the allocation of 100
household resources as well as labor supply decisions (Ghosh and Kanbur, 2008; Agarwal, 101
2004; Sahn and Stifel, 2002; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). As a result, a woman with 102
little bargaining power within the household gets a smaller share of the household's resources 103
than a woman with more bargaining power (Phipps and Burton, 1998; Thomas, 1990). The 104
greater the woman's control over resources, the higher the level of investment in children. 105
Household resource allocations can vary signicantly depending on who makes the decisions: 106
men spend most of the money on personal consumption while women channel a large share 107
to their children's education and health (Kanbur and Haddad, 1994). 108
Since female bargaining power is an inherently unobservable concept, the economic lit- 109
erature uses proxies to control for it. Education, contraceptive use, and asset-ownership 110
are three key proxies; evidence from India shows strong positive correlations among female 111
education, freedom of movement, and better maternal health (Malhotra et al., 2003). Rah- 112
man and Rao (2004) study the determinants of female autonomy in India, nding that a 113
better-educated mother has greater bargaining power. They also nd culture, as measured 114
by state xed-eects, to be signicant despite several control variables. Schuler and Hashemi 115
(1994) nd that more empowered women are more likely to use contraception in Bangladesh 116
Beegle et al. (2001) nd evidence that a woman's inuence on resource allocation varies 117
with her family's social status and with her and her father's education relative to that of her 118
6husband. A woman with some assets that she perceives as her own also has a greater inu- 119
ence on reproductive- and child- health decisions than a woman with no share of household 120
assets. 121
While the economic literature often ignores the role of networks in determining female 122
power, the demographic diusion literature has extensively studied the impact of social 123
interactions on individual contraceptive use. Social learning and social inuence describe 124
how individuals act on information acquired from peers (Montgomery and Casterline, 1996). 125
In this literature, social learning occurs when women obtain information about contraceptive 126
methods from peers and family. Therefore, social networks provide information and help 127
individuals gauge the quality of the information (Kohler et al., 2001). Social inuence occurs 128
when individuals act in similar ways to avoid conict within the social group. Networks also 129
work through examples to encourage individuals to copy peers' behavior (Behrman et al., 130
2002). Networks thus provide the set of peers to whom we compare ourselves and relative 131
to whom we dene our well-being (Akerlof, 1980). 132
Few papers have linked the theoretical advances of the contraceptive-use diusion liter- 133
ature with the female bargaining power literature. No other paper has used self-reported 134
networks in studying the determinants of female power and child welfare. Can peer networks 135
increase female intrahousehold bargaining power and thereby improve investments in child 136
welfare? In this paper, we seek to ll this gap by explicitly modeling female bargaining 137
power as a function of connectedness to peer networks. 138
3 The Mahila Samakhya Program 139
In 1988, Mahila Samakhya was launched in three states of India to improve formal, informal, 140
and vocational education for women. The community-level program was placed in districts 141
targeted both for their low rates of female education and low school attendance by girls, rela- 142
tive to male educational outcomes. The program also targets remote areas, with little access 143
7to infrastructure. Participation in the program is voluntary, and no monetary incentives are 144
oered.4
145
Mahila Samakhya started in Uttarakhand in 1995 and implements its agenda through 146
village-level groups of women. The program is funded by the Indian government and the 147
British Department for International Development. Annual national and state reviews of 148
the program use summary statistics to evaluate its eectiveness in increasing female empow- 149
erment, as measured by educational attainment, the regularity of village- and district-level 150
group meetings, and political participation in the village council. Reviews also use informa- 151
tion from focus groups to gauge whether the program has raised the level of condence and 152
the sense of community in participants. Janssens (2010) uses Intent-to-Treat estimates to 153
evaluate the Mahila Samakhya program in the state of Bihar, and nds that the program 154
signicantly increases trust and engenders social capital. Non-participant households in pro- 155
gram villages also exhibit higher levels of trust and are more likely to engage in community 156
building activities than households in non-program villages. 157
Mahila Samakhya conducts literacy camps and provides continuing formal education to 158
women and girls. The program provides vocational training to enable participants to earn an 159
income. Participants have used the training to become midwives, herbal medicine manufac- 160
turers, bakers, grocers, candle makers, and tailors. In addition, the program provides special 161
education on resolving domestic disputes and conicts within the community. The program 162
also encourages women to participate in village politics as a means of self-empowerment. 163
Participants hear about the success women have had in the labor force, and the important 164
roles women can play in Indian society. They are also told about the benets of having a 165
daughter and of not discriminating against her. Groups of participants support each other 166
on issues like domestic violence, alcoholism, dowry, and female infanticide. 167
Village- and district-level meetings allow participants to step outside their homes and 168
villages, making their lives less solitary. They meet women from other villages, castes, and 169
4When participants travel to district-meetings, they are housed and fed at the program headquarters,
and their travel expenses are reimbursed.
8religions, which expands their peer networks and also lets them engage in conversation not 170
pertaining to domestic chores and family. The semi-formal and well-structured nature of 171
these interactions facilitates dialogue, and enhances the program's eectiveness. The infor- 172
mation provided by Mahila Samakhya as well as that exchanged within the newly-expanded 173
networks can help change social norms. The learned vocational skills allow participants to 174
engage in income-generating activities. Changed social norms and the ability to earn an 175
income enables these women to have greater control over household resources. 176
4 The Causal Mechanisms 177
Mahila Samakhya has two eects on female empowerment: one direct, and one indirect. 178
The direct eect works through education, while the indirect eect works through changing 179
social networks. In this paper, we examine the indirect eect. Figure 2 describes the causal 180
mechanisms at work. The ovals represent observables| participation in Mahila Samakhya, 181
individual characteristics, the size, strength, and composition of networks, investments in 182
child welfare, and remittances from children. The blocks represent unobservables| village 183
culture, identity utility from the social norm, constraints placed by the social norm, and 184
individual bargaining power. Dotted lines present feedback eects, such as the eect of the 185
program on village culture via individual characteristics . 186
4.1 Direct Eect 187
Participation in the program increases the woman's educational attainment, which is an en- 188
dogenous individual characteristic. Providing a woman education improves her job prospects 189
(Phipps and Burton, 1998). When bargaining with her husband over household resources, 190
knowing about better job opportunities and having more marketable skills increase her dis- 191
agreement utility. More education thus raises bargaining power, which in turn increases the 192
investment in children. 193
94.2 Indirect Eect 194
Participation also expands peer networks and access to information. In interviews, partici- 195
pants reported not even knowing ve people outside their families prior to participation in 196
the program. Mahila Samakhya introduced them to many more women, and through them 197
to information on the opportunities and facilities available to women. Participants then 198
realized the benets of educating their daughters and of immunizing their children. The 199
program also changes the composition of networks by introducing women from dierent vil- 200
lages, sub-castes and castes, and religions, which diversies networks. Higher caste women 201
are more likely to be educated, and meeting more high caste women may encourage lower 202
caste women to avail of the educational facilities provided by the program. 203
The inuence of and learning from peers aect (1) a woman's bargaining power, (2) the 204
constraints placed by the social norm, and (3) the identity utility received from belonging 205
to a group. Strong networks provide support groups that inuence individual behavior 206
and increase the woman's power within her household. Individuals also learn from and are 207
inuenced by friends. Observing peers adopt new behaviors inuences a woman's behavior 208
because she trusts her peers and their judgment. Finally, people receive identity utility from 209
belonging to a network, and from behaving like their friends, allowing networks to further 210
inuence behavior. 211
4.2.1 Bargaining Power 212
The social inuence of networks changes individual bargaining power. Participants have 213
more opportunities to interact with their peers, especially away from home. They develop 214
a stronger network that can support them if they face domestic violence, or help change 215
the household resource allocation. A woman with no support group will remain in the 216
status quo for fear of being ostracized. By organizing women into support groups, the 217
program increases their power within the household and community without fear of social 218
sanction. The support group also intervenes directly when a participant's family refuses to 219
10improve its treatment of her. A participant reported that her Mahila Samakhya network 220
intervened when her husband and in-laws did not allow her to feed her daughter as well 221
as her son. Another respondent said that her husband's treatment of her improved after 222
she joined Mahila Samakhya because he was worried that program ocials would intervene 223
in his domestic life and shame him in the village. Participants have \strong ties" (Kohler 224
et al., 2001), which give them the strength and condence to have greater say within the 225
household. 226
4.2.2 Constraints Placed by Norms 227
Social learning can help remove the constraints placed by norms so women have more choices. 228
A woman can learn new information from her peers. She may not have realized certain choices 229
(for instance, the ability to study or work) were available to her. This eect can be thought 230
of \as expanding the set of choices known to the woman" (Montgomery and Casterline, 231
1996, p. 158). Further, the outcomes of the educational and employment choices made by 232
her friends provide an \empirical demonstration of the range of consequences that can follow 233
from the adoption of a particular choice and may thereby shape the woman's subjective 234
probability distributions" (Montgomery and Casterline, 1996, p. 158). Such learning is not 235
restricted to close friends and can occur through \weak ties" (Granovetter, 1983), such as 236
the ties with program participants from other villages. 237
Information about new opportunities can also be valuable for it's own sake. For instance, 238
one interviewed participant said that just knowing that women were successful lawyers, diplo- 239
mats, professors, and entrepreneurs changed her outlook on life. The information caused her 240
to want to earn an income and be more self-reliant. This eect of information is consis- 241
tent with Jensen and Oster's (2009) nding that urban Indian women with access to cable 242
television were more empowered than those without cable television. 243
The question then arises, why do social norms that harm individuals persist in the absence 244
of an intervention like Mahila Samakhya, and how do network-based learning and inuence 245
11interact with such norms? Akerlof (1980) notes social norms disadvantageous to individuals 246
may persist for fear of social sanction by the group against the individual trying to challenge 247
the social norm| social inuence at work. Further, people may not want to be outliers 248
because of a negative feedback loop resulting from the social relativism of others. Program 249
participants often reported being unsure what others would say if they tried to stand up to 250
their in-laws or stop their husbands from hitting them| \We did not want to risk being 251
dierent." As well as improving connections with existing peers, the program alters peer 252
sets by expanding networks. Program workers are also more empowered than average, and 253
provide a reference point for a dierent social norm. 254
4.2.3 Identity Utility 255
Peers behave like one another not only to avoid conict and to coordinate with each other 256
but also because they gain identity utility from being insiders in the group (Akerlof and 257
Kranton, 2010). Identity is endogenous and thus identity utility is inuenced by changes in 258
the reference group. The program changes the participant's relative set of peers so that the 259
people she compares herself with are now more educated and have less traditional attitudes 260
about women's role in society. Respondents often talked of the pride they felt in being pro- 261
gram participants, and how they were happier because of the changes in their peer network. 262
Non-participants have weaker ties to peers, hence their identity utility from belonging to a 263
network is lower than that of participants. 264
4.2.4 Village Culture 265
Changes in peer networks can cause more women to study, have jobs, and be empowered, 266
but in the absence of a program like Mahila Samakhya networks are the realization of village 267
culture. If the culture is such that most women only interact with others of their sub-caste, 268
peer networks will be stratied by sub-caste. Mahila Samakhya changes networks, which 269
aects individual characteristics and thereby inuences village culture. Networks become 270
12more diverse, and eventually change the village culture so it is more accommodating of such 271
diversity. By aecting endogenous characteristics like education, the direct eect of the 272
program also changes the village culture. 273
4.2.5 Feedback Eects 274
Learning and inuence associated with networks can also have important feedback eects on 275
the household and on village culture. Changes in networks can aect individual characteris- 276
tics like education, contraceptive use, and mobility. These changes lead to more empowered 277
women, and thus greater investments in children. More empowered, educated, and mobile 278
women also change village culture. Participants told us that before joining the program 279
they faced a constricting social norm, reinforced by the village culture. They could not 280
work, were barely educated, had little say in the resources allocated to their children, and 281
were told to discriminate against daughters. Their identity was always subsumed in their 282
husband's, brother's, father's, or in-laws' identity. After participating in Mahila Samakhya, 283
women realize they have their own identity, that they can work if they want to, that they 284
should study, and that they can inuence household and community decisions. In the long 285
run, as more people invest in their children, and investments become more equitable between 286
the two sexes, the village culture will reect the new patterns in investment. 287
Coleman (1988) notes both the power of information, and the cost of its acquisition. 288
Along with explicitly providing participants information on various possibilities they might 289
not otherwise know about, information also has indirect eects by expanding the perceived 290
feasible set for participants. Through its eect on peer networks, Mahila Samakhya changes 291
the norm faced by participants as well as their identity. Directly and indirectly, the program 292
changes the woman's bargaining power and enables her to allocate more resources to her 293
children. The greater investments in child welfare may lead to larger remittances to parents 294
when they are old. 295
135 Model 296
In this paper, we start with a basic Nash bargaining problem and model the husband and wife 297
as playing a cooperative Nash bargaining game. If the bargain breaks down, the husband 298
and wife each receive their disagreement utility, which is lower than what they would have 299
received if the bargain had been successful (McElroy, 1990; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). 300
The standard household Nash bargaining model does not account for the role of networks in 301
determining disagreement utility, nor for the eects of identity utility or social learning and 302
inuence on the outcome of the bargain. To incorporate networks into the Nash bargaining 303
model, we make the following changes: rst, we model the adults as maximizing their utility 304
for two time periods over a bundle, x, comprising a private good c, leisure l, and a public 305
good reected by investment in children r and their share of control over household resources, 306
. The bargain leads to optimal values of the bundle for each adult, x and . These 307
consumption bundles belong to a set fXg of all possible choices of x. In period one, the 308
adults choose their optimal x for each time period to maximize the current period utility 309
and expected utility in the next time period. 310
To model constraints imposed by the norms, we make the set of choices X known to 311
an individual a mapping of the set of observed choices available to his/her peers XN. The 312
observed set of choices available to peers, XN, is in turn the union of all the consumption 313
bundles chosen by them.5
314
Second, we represent the inuence of networks by assuming individuals receive utility by 315
being better o than their peers, and a suer a penalty to utility if they are worse than their 316
peers. The additional bonus or penalty utility is denoted as Ur, and is a function of the 317
average utility of the social network, N. We thus add identity utility Ur from the relative 318
set or network N, to each utility function. Since male and female networks are dierent, we 319
5The set XN does not include choices available to peers but not chosen by them because the maximizing
individual only observes his/her peers actions. For instance, the participant who said that knowing women
can be lawyers, doctors etc. empowered her did not say that knowing that women know they can be lawyers
also empowered her. Therefore, only the observed x matters.
14use the subscripts m and f to denote these dierences. Identity utility can be negative if the 320
individual is worse-o than her reference group, and positive if she is not worse o than her 321
peers. Note also that identity utility increases in the strength of ties. The third change to 322
the basic Nash bargaining problem reects social inuence on individual bargaining power 323
by making disagreement utilities V a function of networks because networks can provide 324
support in domestic disputes. The exponents  and  reect the relative levels of bargaining 325
power captured by husband and wife. These exponents reect village culture, and can change 326
over time to reect a more equitable culture. 327
The household thus faces the following maximization problem with respect to the con- 328
straints on x described above, and a full-income budget constraint. 329
max
xf;xm;
[Uf(xf;1) + EUf(xf;2) + Ur(Nf)   Vf(Nf)]

[Um(xm;1) + EUm(xm;2) + Ur(Nm)   Vm(Nm)]

s.t. 2;3;4;7
(1)
x 2 fXg (2)
X = f(XN) (3)
XN =
[
x

N (4)
The household's full-income budget constraint (FIBC) derives from the individual budget 330
constraints faced by the man and the woman. Each gets utility from consuming the vector 331
of goods x in each time period. The vectors pm and pf reect the prices faced by the man 332
and the woman. The prices associated with the private good c and leisure l are pc, wf for 333
the woman, and wm for the man. We model the public good r as a numeraire, hence the 334
15associated price is one. Since the woman has an economic incentive to invest more in her 335
children, her optimal choice of i is greater than the man's optimal choice. The woman's 336
FIBC looks as follows: 337
pf(xf;1 + xf;2)  
"
X
t=1;2
Yf;t + (Ym;1 + Ym;2) + E(Tf) + E(Tm)
#
(5)
where  represents the wife's control over the share of assets and  represents the prob- 338
ability that the woman is married in period 2. The share is endogenous, so that as the 339
woman's bargaining power and identity utility increase, so does . E(T) refers to the ex- 340
pected transfers from children. The man's FIBC looks as follows: 341
pm(xm;1 + xm;2)  (1   )
"
X
t=1;2
Ym;t + (Yf;1 + Yf;2) + E(Tm) + E(Tf)
#
(6)
Adding up the constraints in equation 5 and equation 6 yields the full-income budget 342
constraint faced by the household (equation 7). 343
pf(xf;1 + xf;2) + pm(xm;1 + xm;2) 
X
t=1;2
Ym;t + 
"
X
t
Yf;t  
X
t
Ym;t
#
+ (Ym;1 + Ym;2   Yf;1   Yf;2)
+(Yf;1 + Yf;2) + [E(Tm) + (E(Tf)   E(Tm)   E(Tf)]
(7)
Consider the husband and wife's utility to be the outputs produced by the household; 344
these outputs are a function of the utility from labor allocation, consumption, investment 345
in children, and participation in networks. A household utility possibilities frontier (UPF) 346
gives us all the feasible pairs of husband and wife utility production. We perceive three ways 347
in which bargaining power, social norms or information sets might aect the observed equi- 348
librium. (1) Levels of and changes in bargaining power can aect the observed equilibrium. 349
If a woman does not have much bargaining power, the equilibrium will result in greater 350
16utility to the husband than to the wife. (2) Further, not knowing about all the choices or 351
feasible levels of utility might constrain the equilibrium to a subset of the full UPF. The 352
social norm might constrict women so they may not realize that certain high levels of utility 353
are attainable. (3) Finally, if the woman's relative set of peers follow the social norm, i.e. 354
do not work and have little or no education, the household may be on a lower UPF than it 355
would otherwise. 356
Figure 3 represents the household's utility space, a UPF, and the equilibrium resulting 357
from the husband and wife's choice sets. The dashed lines represent the husband and wife's 358
levels of disagreement utility. If the bargain breaks down, they receive Vm and Vf, represented 359
in utility-space by the intersection of the two dashed lines. The disagreement utilities place 360
lower bounds on the UPF with respect to the x  and y  axes. Now consider the situation 361
in which the woman joins Mahila Samakhya, and the resultant support group intervenes in 362
her domestic situation and increases her disagreement utility so that she is better-o even 363
if the bargain breaks down. Also consider the case in which her husband's disagreement 364
utility decreases because the support group forces him to improve his treatment of her. The 365
new disagreement utilities, represented by the dotted lines, expose a previously-unattainable 366
part of the UPF that represents higher utility to the woman, and limits part of the UPF 367
associated with lower utility to her. 368
In the ow chart, this eect is depicted through the program's impact on individual 369
bargaining power. The anecdote of the woman who said her husband's treatment of her 370
improved after she joined the program because he was afraid of being shamed in the village 371
mirrors this eect on bargaining power. Further, by providing support groups the program 372
decreases the woman's fear of ostracism and empowers her to change her situation within 373
the household. Social inuence thus enables the woman to change the available UPF to 374
include better outcomes for her and restrict the possibilities that make her worse o. The 375
educational eect of the program also increases the woman's disagreement utility by raising 376
her reservation wage: knowing about better job prospects and having more marketable skills 377
17raise the reservation wage and thus increase bargaining power. 378
Social learning enables Mahila Samakhya to change the social norm through the \ex- 379
pansion of the set of choices available to women" and the \the empirical demonstration of 380
the range of consequences" from adopting certain behaviors (Montgomery and Casterline, 381
1996, p. 158). Figure 4 illustrates how the constraints placed by the program can restrict 382
the UPF to a small portion of the true frontier. Point A is a possible equilibrium outcome, 383
at which the husband's utility is Um
A and the wife's utility is U
f
A. However, neither spouse 384
knows the extent of true UPF because social norms constrain their choice sets to less than 385
the full feasible set. Constraints on the husband restrict the frontier along the x-axis, while 386
constraints on the wife limit the frontier along the y-axis. Point B is on the same UPF but 387
is not available because the higher level of female utility it represents is ruled out by social 388
norms. The indirect network eect of Mahila Samakhya removes the constraints| initially 389
only for the woman, but eventually also for her husband. Point B now becomes feasible. A 390
move to point B would increase her utility (U
f
B > U
f
A) and decrease her husband's utility 391
(Um
B < Um
A ). 392
Even without the constraints, a move from A to B would not be observed if the woman's 393
bargaining power was very low. The household's relative value of a woman's happiness 394
increases in the woman's bargaining power, hence the slope of the indierence curve at the 395
point of tangency to the UPF is the ratio of bargaining powers, BPf=BPm. To observe an 396
equilibrium where the woman gets a larger share of utility, the value of the exponent  must 397
increase. The values of  and  depend on village culture. If the culture is such that women 398
do not get a large share of utility, then  will continue to be low. By changing endogenous 399
individual characteristics like education and mobility, Mahila Samakhya changes the village 400
culture. Over time, exposure to the program can result in a new culture where the exponents 401
are similar in magnitude, reecting a more equal distribution of bargaining power. 402
The third eect of networks might be to shift out the UPF available to the household. 403
The woman's utility is a function of the attitude or actions of her peers| her \relative set". 404
18She denes her well-being relative to them, and gains identity utility from behaving like 405
them (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). If her relative set of peers have traditional attitudes and 406
adhere to the social norm although it discriminates against them, their ties are likely to be 407
weak, hence the woman's gain in identity utility is also low. Such a relative set leaves little 408
scope for social learning and may cause the woman's household to be on a lower UPF than 409
they can attain. However, identity also has a relative component. The woman gains utility 410
from being at least as well o as her peers, and loses utility if she is worse-o than them. By 411
observing other women holding jobs and being educated, the woman is motivated to make 412
similar changes in her life. 413
If the program strengthens a woman's peer network, she stands to gain identity utility. 414
The program also introduces her to more empowered women, who likely receive a greater 415
share of the household's utility. She now needs an even higher level of utility than before in 416
order to be as well o as her peers. At point A in gure 5, without accounting for identity 417
utility, the woman receives U
f
A in utility. Her relative set of peers have a higher level of 418
utility, U1
r, which eectively shifts back her UPF. After accounting for this loss in utility, the 419
woman only receives U
f;r
A . Now if the equilibrium is at point B, so she is better o than her 420
peers, which shifts out her UPF. The gain in identity utility means she eectively receives 421
U
f;r
B > U
f
B. Now if the woman's relative set changes because of Mahila Samakhya and the 422
new relative set has higher utility, U2
r, the woman needs a greater gain in utility to be as 423
well-o as before. Now, some parts of the UPF (between X and Y on the y axis, where 424
she was better-o than a less empowered relative set) shift in because she is worse o than 425
her new relative set. Stronger networks from participation thus lead to a greater change in 426
identity utility than a weaker network. 427
In this framework, the direct (educational) eect of the program raises the woman's 428
bargaining power through an increase in her opportunity cost. The indirect (network) eect 429
of the program works through networks to change the woman's bargaining power, increase 430
the feasible set of choices available to her, and change the UPF that is attainable to her 431
19household. The model presented here yields testable hypotheses that we can examine using 432
the data. 433
6 Identication Strategy 434
Our identication strategy has three parts: rst, we identify causal peer eects using a recent 435
extension to networks of the Generalized Spatial 2SLS estimator. Next, we instrument for 436
the endogeneity of program participation using family composition. Finally, we instrument 437
for the endogeneity of networks using distance to rewood and water source. 438
6.1 Identifying Peer Eects 439
Manski (1993) points out that the reection problem confounds the identication of causal 440
peer eects. Do people behave in similar ways because they have learned from or been 441
inuenced by their friends, or are they friends because they behave in similar ways? Manski 442
presents three hypotheses regarding the observed similarities in the behavior of friends. (1) 443
Correlated eects occur when people act alike because they face a similar environment or 444
have similar characteristics. (2) Contextual eects such that the \propensity of an individual 445
to behave in some way varies with the distribution of background characteristics in the 446
group" (Manski, 2007, p. 1). (3) Endogenous eects, where the group aects individual 447
behavior through social interaction. The third eect is key to identifying the causal impact 448
of networks. 449
Much of the literature following Manski (1993) has focused on the econometric issue of 450
separating the causal peer eect from that of correlated unobservables (Conley and Udry, 451
2008; Miguel and Kremer, 2004, Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). A straightforward way 452
of disentangling these eects is to randomize the intervention or new technology at the 453
friend-level (Oster and Thornton, 2009). Randomization allows for the identication of the 454
endogenous eect because the number of friends who receive the intervention or technology 455
20is exogenous. The Mahila Samakhya intervention is not randomized, so our identication 456
strategy uses a recent extension to networks of Kelejian and Prucha's (1996) Generalized 457
Spatial 2SLS estimator. 458
Our identication strategy relies on overlapping peer networks to identify causal peer 459
eects. We use a recently developed technique (Bramoull e et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010) 460
in which partially overlapping networks generate friends of friends or \excluded friends". 461
Since a woman does not know (or know well) these excluded friends, they can only aect 462
her behavior through shared friends. Similarities in the behavior of excluded friends and the 463
woman is then evidence that networks change behavior. We use information on self-reported 464
friends to generate a weight for each pair of friends such that the higher the weight, the 465
stronger the friendship, and the greater the hypothesized inuence of or learning from the 466
friend. Then, the excluded friend's inuence on the individual is weighted by the shared 467
friend's inuence 468
Even after identifying the causal eect, correlated eects continue to be a source of bias, 469
particularly in the presence of proxy-reported peer behavior (Hogset and Barrett, 2010). 470
Since we conduct follow-up interviews with friends (called snowball sampling), our data face 471
reduced problems with correlated eects. Another benet of using excluded friends to instru- 472
ment for the endogeneity of peer behavior is that the network yields a substantial number 473
of instruments to account for correlated eects. The combination of snowball sampling and 474
the use of excluded friends as instruments allows us to isolate the eect of interactions from 475
that of the individual group shock. 476
6.2 Endogeneity of Program Participation and Networks 477
Since participation in Mahila Samakhya is most likely endogenous, we use family composi- 478
tion as an instrumental variable. A woman who lives near younger sisters-in-law (husband's 479
younger sisters or husband's younger brother's wife) can rely on these sisters-in-law to look 480
after her children as well as any domestic chores while she attends Mahila Samakhya ac- 481
21tivities. Relationship hierarchy prevents a woman from asking her parents-in-law or older 482
sisters-in-law to take care of her share of housework, but allows her to ask a younger sister- 483
in-law for such help. Most families in the region are extended in structure, and male siblings 484
live close to each other. So, if a woman has younger sisters-in-law (particularly the husband's 485
brother's wife), they likely live nearby and facilitate her participation in the program. 486
Similarly, a woman with children of dierent ages can have her older children attend to 487
younger siblings and take care of housework while the mother attends program activities. 488
On the other hand, women with young children of similar ages nd it dicult to leave their 489
houses for extended periods of time and are unlikely to participate in the program. Therefore, 490
we use family composition variables to instrument for the endogeneity of program participa- 491
tion. Note that we do not assume that sisters-in-law or children facilitate participation: we 492
specically ask respondents who looks after their domestic chores and youngest child while 493
they are participating in the program. 494
Another source of endogeneity may arise from the networks themselves. Women with 495
more spare time may have larger and stronger peer networks. We control for this endogeneity 496
of networks using time to the source of rewood and water as our instruments. Water and 497
rewood collection from the forest are women's tasks. Often the sources of water and rewood 498
are several hours away and women must spend a large part of the day in the forest, leaving 499
little time for interaction with others. Even when women travel to these sources in groups, 500
they must walk up and down sides of hills and are hard at work in the forest, neither of 501
which facilitates interaction. As a result, those with distant rewood and water sources have 502
smaller and weaker networks. 503
7 Data 504
Researchers have used caste to proxy for peers in India because caste is a strong signier of 505
networks (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006), but there may be networks of varying strength 506
22within castes. Household data from India do not include report information on self-reported 507
networks, and preclude an analysis of the eect of networks on child welfare. As a result, 508
we collect our own data from the north Indian state of Uttarakhand, collecting information 509
on instruments for social learning, inuence, female power, and their role on child nutrition 510
outcomes. In addition, we also collect data on participation in Mahila Samakhya. Program 511
centers have been present in Uttarakhand villages for periods lasting anywhere from three 512
months to ve years, allowing us to use time-variation in exposure to the program to identify 513
its impact on networks and child nutrition. 514
Our data are from six of thirteen Uttarakhand districts, four with the program and two 515
without. The target sample size is 500 women. We employ restricted snowball sampling 516
where we start with ve women in each village and then follow up with two of their ve 517
closest friends. Our survey instrument includes the following key questions: 518
 Networks: 519
{ Who are your ve closest friends and how do you know these people? How often 520
do you see them? Where do you usually see them? 521
{ Do you participate in the Mahila Samakhya intervention? How about your closest 522
friends? 523
{ How important is it to you and your husband what your friends and the commu- 524
nity think of you? 525
{ If one of your friends told you to give your daughter more milk, would you? 526
 Proxies for Female Autonomy: 527
{ What kind of work do you do? What kind of work does your husband do? 528
{ Do you currently use contraception? If not, why not? If yes, what type? 529
{ What is your level of education? What is your husband's level of education? 530
23 Investment in Children: 531
{ How much should a child be educated? How much education will your children 532
receive? 533
{ Do you expect to receive monetary or other assistance from your children when 534
you are old? 535
{ How much food has each child eaten in the past 24 hours? (Enumerators are 536
provided standard bowls and respondents are asked to estimate how many bowls 537
of food each child ate.) 538
{ How many hours did each child spend on chores in the past 24 hours? Which 539
chores did they help out with? 540
{ How much do you spend each month on your children's education? 541
{ Information on each child's immunization status and their height. 542
These questions will help us identify the eect of peer networks on an individual's house- 543
hold bargaining power and therefore on child welfare. 544
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